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Dean Clark's wideranging article' takes as its point of departure a
problem in corporate law- or more precisely, in corporate law scholar-
ship-but this problem is for him simply an occasion to discuss a
broader set of questions concerning the nature and comparative advan-
tages of three different sorts of norms, norms that in Dean Clark's view
play a legitimate role in law, and in many other areas of social life as
well. His article is thus not centrally about corporate law, or even the
law in general. Its real subject is an even wider one: the normative
ordering of human conduct in all its different facets. It is clear that
Dean Clark's main interest is in this larger topic, and I shall treat his
article as an invitation to offer some similarly broad comments of my
own.
Dean Clark's target is the so-called "contractual" theory of law, a
theory that has in recent years become particularly prominent in corpo-
rate law scholarship (though of course not only there) 2 The strengths
and weaknesses of the contractual theory have been spotlighted in the
debate, to which the articles in this Symposium are devoted, over the
role of mandatory rules in corporate law, and the wisdom of permitting
parties to opt out of requirements that have traditionally been regarded
as compulsory. Because Dean Clark's argument is directed against the
contractual theory of law, it will help, I think, to begin by asking what it
is that proponents of this theory hold.
Assume that two parties have made an agreement to exchange
goods or services- any sort of agreement, not necessarily the kind with
which corporate law is specifically concerned. At a minimum, both
must believe they will be made better off by the agreement, for if either
does not, he will refuse to accept its terms. If we assume, in addition,
that each is also able to judge his own self-interest accurately (a contro-
versial assumption, as I discuss below), then it follows that their agree-
ment must in fact be mutually beneficial, as the parties themselves
believe. And if no one else's welfare is decreased as a result, it further
follows that the overall welfare of society must increase too. That being
so, proponents of contractualism argue, the agreement should be
enforced.
The word "enforced," however, immediately conjures up some-
thing beyond the agreement itself, namely, the background rules and
* Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Clark, Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1703 (1989).
2. See, e.g., T.Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy 17 & n.22 (1986) (hy-
pothetical contract among creditors); K. Scheppele, Legal Secrets 57-85 (1988)
(describing contractual theory of law generally).
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institutions of the legal order that are implicitly assumed whenever we
speak of enforceable agreements or contracts. In fact, if we think of the
parties not merely as agreeing, but as contracting, it is obvious that
their undertaking presupposes the existence of a wide range of back-
ground rules. Such rules include those that specify how contracts shall
be formed and enforced, as well as those that indicate what perform-
ance the parties are obligated to render, in the absence, at least, of any
agreement to the contrary. Every contract presupposes some legal
background of this sort-the very idea of a contract implies as much-
and what makes contractualism interesting is that it purports to offer a
model for explaining, and for evaluating, this legal background. In-
deed, if it did not claim to do that, contractualism, whatever its contri-
butions to other areas of political thought, could hardly be called a
theory of law at all.
But of course the rules that form the legal background for any par-
ticular agreement have not themselves been invented by the parties to
it. These rules antedate the parties' agreement, in contrast to those
provisions which the parties have actually created on their own. It fol-
lows that the legal background to a contract cannot be described, or
critically evaluated, by asking whether it is part of the structure which
the parties have constructed for themselves, since by definition it is not.
At this point, contractualists must resort to the device of a hypothetical
agreement if they are to make any theoretical headway at all.
Hypothetical contract arguments are now a familiar feature of the
academic legal literature. In general terms, such arguments assert that
if (contrary to fact) the parties to a transaction-had deliberated before-
hand about a particular background rule, they would or would not, as
the case may be, have agreed to adopt the rule and be governed by its
requirements. All hypothetical contract arguments have this formal
structure.3 Before any specific conclusion can be drawn from such an
argument, however, it is obvious that one must make a number of addi-
tional assumptions about the information the parties bring with them to
their imaginary deliberations and also about their preferences or tastes
(are the parties, for example, to be presumed risk neutral or averse?).
Unless one makes some such assumptions, no judgments of any kind
can be reached concerning the parties' agreement. Different assump-
tions about their information or tastes will yield different conclusions,
which is why arguments from hypothetical agreement are so often
controversial.
The point I want to stress now, however, is a different one. In the
case of actual agreements, it is possible to infer the mutually beneficial
character of an arrangement from the fact that the parties have agreed
to it themselves (though this inference depends, as I emphasize below,
3. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
1416, 1433, 1444-45 (1989).
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on contestible empirical assumptions). In the case of hypothetical
agreements, however, no such inference is possible, for the obvious
reason that it is entirely up to us, the framers of the hypothesis, to say
what the imaginary parties to any such agreement will agree to in the
first place. And the only way we can do that is to decide what arrange-
ment best serves their mutual interests, given the information and pref-
erences we have assigned them. Once that decision has been made, we
simply infer their agreement to the arrangement in question, whatever
its features may be, and since the parties themselves are figments of our
imagination, it is impossible- conceptually impossible-for them ever
to reach an actual agreement that conflicts with the one we attribute to
them.
The inference in all hypothetical agreements must therefore be
from mutual benefit to consent, rather than the other way around, as in
the case of actual agreements. But this means that once we have de-
cided that a particular legal r~ule will maximize the parties' welfare,
given the assumptions we have made about their knowledge and tastes,
the assertion that they would themselves hypothetically agree to its
adoption adds no independentjustificatory force of its own, for this last
claim follows automatically from-it is entailed by-the rule's welfare-
enhancing character. Put differently, once we have concluded, for
whatever reasons, that a rule is welfare-enhancing, the assertion that
the parties to a hypothetical contract would voluntarily choose it adds
nothing but rhetorical force to our conclusion; it is, so to speak, pure
window-dressing. Hypothetical contract arguments are thus not really
contractualist at all. They explain and justify their conclusion by an
appeal to considerations of welfare alone, the latter providing their
necessary and sufficient conditions. In arguments of this sort, contrac-
tualism is therefore something of a misnomer. A better term would be
welfarism, for in the case of hypothetical contracts it is to the welfare of
the parties, and that alone, that one must look, in the absence of any
other basis for imputing an agreement to them.
What about actual agreements? What is their status within the
contractualist theory of law? For the theory to be consistent, the justifi-
cation that it offers for the adoption of certain background rules must
be the same as the one it offers for honoring actual agreements, to the
extent it insists that such agreements be enforced. But actual agree-
ments and hypothetical agreements (which must be relied upon to jus-
tify the background rules) do not in reality share the property of being
agreements; they share it in name only. What they do share (poten-
tially, at least) is the property of being welfare-enhancing, and so if ac-
tual agreements are to be justified on the same grounds as hypothetical
ones it must be by appealing to considerations of welfare too.
So far as their welfare effects are concerned, however, there is an
obvious difference between hypothetical and actual agreements. Hypo-
thetical agreements are always welfare-enhancing: they are so by defi-
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nition, for the reasons I have indicated. Actual agreements, by
contrast, need not be and sometimes aren't. Whether they are or are
not welfare-enhancing is a contingent matter that depends on various
factors including, importantly, the information possessed by the parties
at the time they make their agreement. Put differently, there is always a
logical possibility that agreement and welfare will not coincide in the
case of actual agreements, but no such possibility in the case of their
hypothetical counterparts. Contractualists who maintain that agree-
ment and welfare always, or often, coincide in the first case too can do
so, therefore, only on empirical grounds, by arguing, in effect, that the
parties always, or generally, know best.
I am not interested here in debating the plausibility of this last
claim, but only in pointing out what kind of claim it is: a claim based
upon contestible factual premises. Of course, one might argue that ac-
tual agreements should be honored, period-not because they pro-
mote the parties' welfare (which they may or may not), but because the
parties are entitled for moral reasons to have their own, possibly mis-
taken, judgments upheld. This argument, to which I shall come back, is
a familiar and in some ways an attractive one, but it is very different
from all hypothetical contract arguments and contractualists cannot ac-
cept it without compromising the internal consistency of their own the-
ory and creating an unresolved, and perhaps unresolvable, tension
between two competing principles of justification. If it is to retain its
theoretical consistency, contractualism must treat considerations of
welfare as the single ultimate criterion of evaluation and apply this one
criterion to actual agreements as well as hypothetical ones.
Which brings me back to Dean Clark's article. Like his contractual-
ist opponents, Dean Clark is also a committed welfarist (he actually
calls himself a consequentialist, 4 but that is an unhelpfully vague term,
for even an egoist who insists that the right policy is always the one that
benefits him, regardless of how it affects other people, is a kind of con-
sequentialist too). That is to say, Dean Clark also takes the welfare of
those who must live under a given normative regime to be the only
basis for assessing its desirability-even when, as in the case of elite-
made and traditional rules, the people subject to them are not the ones
who established the rules in the first place.
The central thesis of Dean Clark's article is that people are some-
times better off following rules laid down by elites or bequeathed to
them by tradition than they would be if they made up the rules them-
selves; and that they are sometimes better off having to live by rules of
the former two sorts without the freedom to modify them as they
choose. 5 Thejustification that Dean Clark offers for this claim is empir-
ical. Rules laid down by elites or established by tradition have advan-
4. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1713 n.30.
5. Id. at 1725.
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tages, he argues, that self-created rules sometimes do not; specifically,
they are often based upon better information. 6 They also, of course,
have costs that self-created rules do not, costs due in both cases to the
fact that those promulgating the rules don't take the parties' interests
as seriously as the parties themselves do (so-called "agency" costs). 7
Balancing the costs and benefits of these two sorts of noncontractual
rules, Dean Clark concludes that it is plausible to think they sometimes
enhance the welfare of the parties to a greater degree than consensual
or self-made rules would.
The first point I want to emphasize is that this argument does not
represent, as Dean Clark seems sometimes to suggest, a fundamental
challenge to the contractual model, for that model also treats the wel-
fare of the parties subject to any given set of rules as the standard or
criterion for evaluating those rules, in exactly the way Dean Clark does.
With respect to their ultimate criterion of value, then, Dean Clark and
the proponents of the contractual theory of law are in agreement.
Where they differ, to the extent they differ at all, is in their empirical
judgments as to which rules are most likely, in a given context, to en-
hance the welfare of those subject to them. This is an important differ-
ence, and I do not mean to minimize its significance, but it is a
disagreement between welfarists who share a common view of what
ought to be the ultimate standard of evaluation. It is therefore not a
disagreement about the status of welfarism (and hence of contractual-
ism) as a theory, but a disagreement within that theory itself.
Consider, for example, how Dean Clark might defend the claim
that a particular rule of law-a traditional rule, let us say, from which
opting out is not allowed-should be preserved in its present
mandatory form. Presumably Dean Clark would argue that if those
subject to the rule could see its benefits as clearly as he himself does,
and could also see that they might be tempted for shortsighted and self-
defeating reasons to want on occasion to waive it, they would them-
selves choose (from this better-informed hypothetical perspective) to
make the rules nonwaivable. The conclusion that they would choose to
forbid subsequent opting out follows directly from the fact that doing
so would leave them better off, all things considered, and so has no
more independentjustificatory force here than it does in the hypotheti-
cal contract arguments of Dean Clark's opponents. Of course, contrac-
tualists might question whether the parties' reasons for wanting to
waive the rule would in fact be self-defeating, and conclude that while
the rule itself is good; it can be made even better-that is, more wel-
fare-enhancing-if it is waivable at the parties' discretion (and between
these positions there are, of course, intermediate ones, for example,
that the rule should be waivable, but only if the parties demonstrate to
6. Id. at 1718-19, 1730-31.
7. Id. at 1719-20, 1731-32.
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someone's satisfaction that they are sufficiently well-informed). Dean
Clark's article usefully reminds us that which of these conclusions we
endorse depends upon empirical considerations of an often complex
sort. It does not, however, offer any grounds for thinking that the prac-
titioners of contractualism are mistaken in anything but their factual
judgments, and in particular it offers no grounds for thinking that their
theory rests upon a mistaken view of the proper criterion for evaluating
different rules, for it embraces and applies the same welfare criterion
that they do.
There are, of course, views that do directly attack this criterion it-
self, and though Dean Clark's paper does not, it suggests what form
these attacks might take. One that I have already mentioned in passing,
and which Dean Clark himself notes, though only to dismiss, is the view
associated with what he calls "the philosopher's argument." The
highest good, defenders of this view maintain, is not welfare but free-
dom, the development and exercise of our human capacity for auton-
omy or self-rule. In considering whether actual agreements ought to
be enforced, they argue, we should ask ourselves whether doing so
would protect and amplify the parties' freedom. Making their freedom
the touchstone of evaluation in this way does not lead automatically to
the conclusion that all actual agreements should be enforced (for it is
plausible to think that some agreements undermine rather than en-
hance autonomy), but it does make it possible to argue that some actual
agreements should be enforced on the grounds that doing so respects
the parties' freedom even though their welfare will, all things consid-
ered, be decreased as a result. This is an argument that no welfarist-
Dean Clark included-can make, and it has considerable force in cer-
tain circumstances (in the general law of contracts, for example, though
not, I think, in the law of corporations as it presently stands).9
One who adopts this point of view will also evaluate background
rules in a different way. He will not ask whether a particular rule, or set
of rules, maximizes welfare, but rather whether it promotes autonomy,
and while it is certainly reasonable to think that welfare is a condition of
freedom, the two notions are not equivalent. Here, too, there is a pos-
sibility they may diverge, and when they do, a proponent of the philos-
opher's argument is committed to preferring freedom over welfare-
which, again, neither Dean Clark nor his contractualist opponents can
ever do.
But this is familiar territory, and I want to conclude by describing
two other less fashionable lines of attack on welfarism which Dean
8. See id. at 1715.
9. See C. Fried, Contract as Promise 16-17 (1981). While this type of argument
has not carried much force in the law of corporations as an empirical matter, it cannot be
discounted as a valid normative approach. Perhaps it is the sense that corporate law in-
volves many society-wide concerns that accounts for the inability of arguments based on
autonomy to make much headway.
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Clark's article, with its provocative emphasis on elite-made and tradi-
tional rules, also suggests. Dean Clark defends the existence and use of
these two sorts of rules, and his defense is likely to arouse in many
readers a vague feeling of concern. Today, elitism and, to a lesser de-
gree, traditionalism, are terms that have largely negative connotations.
But Dean Clark's attempt to give these terms a new respectability is not
as disturbing as it seems, for at bottom it is based on welfarist claims
that many can accept, and not the more unsettling ideas to which genu-
ine elitists and traditionalists sometimes appeal. In Dean Clark's do-
mesticated version of them, these ideas have lost their power to offend
or shock, and with that their capacity to challenge the conventions of
contemporary moral life. The welfarist assumptions on which Dean
Clark's own argument is based must be included among these conven-
tions, indeed among the most widespread and deeply settled ones, and
in evaluating these assumptions themselves it may be helpful to recall
what real elitists and traditionalists say when they speak to us directly.
In some cases, at least, when pressed to justify a rule, real elitists,
instead of appealing to the welfare of those who must live under it, say
simply, "This rule, which we have made, is good because it is good for
us, for the values and practices with which we are associated and from
which we in particular derive special meaning and happiness, even
though those subject to it are worse off than they would be if they were
not." Now in certain circumstances I think this argument has force,
though it runs against our democratic feeling that the interests of dif-
ferent groups should all be treated equally-a feeling which welfarists
like Dean Clark respect by insisting that the legitimacy of any social rule
be decided from the point of view of the welfare of the persons subject
to it. The tenured faculty of the Yale Law School, for example, sets the
rules and makes the decisions concerning the promotion of junior
faculty. This practice is good, I believe, because it is good for the Law
School and for those whose association with it is longest and most com-
plete, namely, the tenured faculty. It could be argued, I suppose, that
elite rule making in this context serves the interests of the junior faculty
too, who must live under the rules their senior colleagues make, though
this seems to me quite doubtful. The important point, however, is that
this elitist practice serves the interests of the institution, and of its prin-
cipal custodians, and that, I think, would be a sufficient justification for
it even if one could demonstrate conclusively that the practice makes
junior faculty worse off. This is real elitism, not the watered-down and
democratically acceptable version that Dean Clark defends on welfarist
grounds, and in certain circumstances there is, I think, much to recom-
mend it.
Something similar may be said about traditionalism. In many tra-
ditions (religious traditions are the best example), the justification that
participants offer for their practices is that the tradition these practices
sustain is itself a source of value, quite apart from the benefits it yields
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to those inovlved. The point of the tradition,' they say, is not to en-
hance the welfare of its followers (though this may be a byproduct of it)
but to serve God, maintain a civilization, produce and protect works of
beauty, and so on-all of which are understood to have a value in-
dependent of the interests of the human beings responsible for doing
so. This view represents, if anything, a more radical assault upon con-
temporary moral sentiments than even the most unashamed elitism, for
while the latter challenges our democratic prejudices, it is at least intel-
ligible. Even if we disapprove of his attitude, we understand what
someone means when he says that the interests and values of his group
are more important than those of some other. Genuine traditionalism,
which in certain of its guises seems to assume that there are goods
which are not the goods of any human beings at all, is likely to appear,
by contrast, wholly unintelligible, for it conflicts with what is perhaps
the deepest and most widely shared orthodoxy of modem moral
thought-the assumption that only the goods of human beings (or per-
haps sentient beings) count in assessing different practices and institu-
tions. Welfarism, of course, subscribes to this orthodoxy too, and so
there can be no room in it for real traditionalism, as opposed to Dean
Clark's pale consequentialist version.
To these last arguments Dean Clark might reply that even if this is
what elitists and traditionalists say, we need not adopt their justifica-
tions in order to defend their practices. Thankfully, he will point out,
we can do so on other less objectionable (or at least currently more
acceptable) grounds. In fact, warming to the argument, he is likely to
assert that there are good welfarist reasons for allowing elitists and tra-
ditionalists to continue to believe what they (mistakenly) do. That he
would say this is suggested by the way he treats the philosopher's insis-
tence on the preeminence of freedom as a value: it is a good thing that
some people believe there is a higher value than welfare because, he
argues, their believing this enhances welfare in a roundabout way, de-
spite their own disinterest in doing so. 10
This last line of argument has been familiar at least since
Sidgwick, 1I but I must confess that I find it unconvincing, for it fails to
come to grips with the question of whether anything other than welfare
ought to count in our moral thinking. Those who say that other things
do count-whether they be elitists, or traditionalists, or champions of
autonomy-are justified in feeling that their arguments have not really
10. See Clark, supra note 1, at 1716-17.
11. For even supposing that this ideal society [in which the principles of
utilitarianism are perfectly applied] is ultimately to be realised, it must at any
rate be separated from us by a considerable interval of evolution; hence-it is not
unlikely that the best way of progressing towards it will be some other than the
apparently directest way, and that we shall reach it more easily if we begin by
moving away from it.
H. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics 470 (1907).
17551989]
HeinOnline -- 89 Colum. L. Rev.  1755 1989
1756 COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 89:1748
been met when it is pointed out that what they want serves welfare too.
This, they will reply, may or may not be true, but is in any case beside
the point. They will demand, rightly in my view, that the question they
raise not be brushed aside. Dean Clark's article brings us back to this
question and though the question itself has little significance for the law
of corporations, and the specific issues of policy which the participants
in this Symposium have debated, it continues to be of very great impor-
tance for moral and political theory generally.
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